Promotion and Mandatory Retirement by Stern, Steve
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
10-1-1985 
Promotion and Mandatory Retirement 
Steve Stern 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Stern, Steve, "Promotion and Mandatory Retirement" (1985). Discussion Papers. 499. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/499 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
EXX>tn1IC GRCWl'H CENI'ER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
P.O. Box 1987, Yale Station 
27 Hillhouse Avenue 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520 
CENI'ER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 491 
PRCl-1011ION AND MANDATORY RETIREMENI' 
steve Stern 
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to stimulate discussion arrl critical camnent. References in 
?,Jblications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the 
author to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
In this paper, a firm maximizes profits over choices of wage schedules, 
hiring schedules, pension schedules and mandatory retirement ages in a nodel 
with tumover costs a,nd a productivity function which depends upon position and 
experience. It is shown that firms may have reason to institute a mandatory 
retirenent age and that they can accomplish the sane goal through proper uses 
of wage and pension schedules. 
Steve stem, "Pronotion and Mandatory Retirenent." 
PrODOtion am Mardatory RetirEDEllt* 
Section I: Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, there has been nuch discussion in the nedia and 
in Congress concerning mandatory retirerrent. Congress has progressively pushed 
back the mininum mandatory retirement age. At this tirre, alrrost all enployees 
are protected against mandatory retirerrent until the age of seventy by the Age 
Discrimination in Enployment Act (ADEA) • The major exenption in the ADEA is 
for errployees in bona-fide executive positions. A firm is allowed to force 
executives to retire so that: 
1) the firm can bring in "new blood" to maintain the inflow of new ideas, 
and 
2) the firm can provide younger enployees with prorrotion opportunities. 
There are those in Congress who are now suggesting a total ban on mandatory 
retirement. 
Many arguments have been suggeste:1 fo.r the existence of mandatory 
retirenent: 
1) Enployees becorre less productive in their sixties, and the 
productivity of individual workers is difficult to rreasure. Age is 
used as a proxy for productivity, and enployees are fire:1 when their 
estimated productivity is below their wage. 
2) Enployees becorre less productive in their sixties, and they prefer to 
retire with a "gold watch" at a cornrron age than to be fired or receive 
a wage reduction individually after being identified as less 
productive. 
3) Mandatory retirement makes it easier for firrrs to corrply with 
affirmative action requirenents. 
The author wishes to thank Bill Johnson, Paul Schultz, Joyce Cooper and 
workshop participants at Yale University and the University of Virginia for 
helpful comrrents. All remaining errors are mme. 
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• 4) Both the firm and the- employee benefit if some portion of wage 
payments are deferred until late in the employee's career. This 
implies that an employee will be paid more than his marginal product 
late in his career. He must be terminated at some point so that the 
net present value of his lifetime wage payments equals the net 
present value of his lifetime marginal product. 
5) Mandatory retirement creates room for promotion of younger employees • 
... 
The first and second arguments assume that older employees become less 
productive. The problem with these arguments is that they require the firm to 
fire employees with a positive marginal product rather than to just lower 
their wages. Some suggest that setting an arbitrary mandatory retirement date 
improves morale relative to lowering wages. However, it is not clear that 
firing an employee under any conditions improves morale relative to lowering 
his wage. Furthermore, there is some evidence [see Clark, Kreps and Spengler 
(1978)] that older employees are not less productive on average. The 
screening problem may present an explanation for mandatory retirement if there 
is adverse selection [see Greenwald (1979) for example]. But this is a 
potential problem at all ages. Why aren't younger employees also subject to a 
screening problem with adverse selection? 
Mandatory retirement may increase the effect of affirmative action 
programs. However, to the extent that affirmative action programs are short 
term programs, this argument does not present a good reason on which to base 
long term decisions. Besides, mandatory retirement existed decades before 
affirmative action programs did. 
The moral hazard argument for mandatory retirement has been suggested by 
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Lazear in a series of papers. Lazear (1979) suggests that the employer­
employee relationship is fraught with moral hazard problems which can be 
solved optimally by deferring some portion of wage payments until late in an 
employee's career while maintaining the present value of an employee's stream 
of earnings. Both the finn and its employee prefer such an arrangement. 
However, this means that the employee will be paid more than his marginal 
product late in his life and will retire later than he would have had wage 
payments not been deferred. Thus, a mandatory retirement program becomes 
necessary to force the employee to retire at his optimal retirement age. 
Lazear (1983) shows that early retirement benefits may be viewed as severance 
pay to emp1oyees who are earning more than thei r ma rgi na1 product. The value 
of the early retirement benefit is equal to the value of a normal retirement 
pension plus any rents ·the employee would have earned had he stayed at the 
firm until the mandatory retirement age. 
There are many problems with Lazear's analysis. First of all, the high 
incidence of early retirement is not consistent with his analysis. Lazear 
(1983} shows that the fiMn may offer early retirement benefits to employees to 
induce them to retire early. However, this argument has no explanatory power 
since both the firm and its employees are indifferent between the employee 
retiring early or at the mandatory retirement age. In fact, the existence of 
adverse selection would make early retirement benefits unprofitable to the 
firm. Furthermore, employees who retire early in Lazear's model should find 
another job. In the real worlq, many early retirees do not find new jobs. 
Second, the purpose of deferring wage payments is to induce employees not 
to 11 shirk 11 or 11 steal from the finn... If an employee is caught shirking, he is 
fired immediately and forfeits any future rents. The return to the employee 
of shirking is a stock. If it were not a stock, no one would ever have 
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incentive to shirk whether or not wages were deferred. But, since it is a 
stock, at some point arbitrarily close to the mandatory retirement age, all 
employees should shirk because the value of a finite stock is always greater 
than the value of a finite flow over a short enough time period. 
A pension program can be instituted with pensions payable only to 
employees who reach the mandatory retirement age. This would provide the firm 
with a method of preventing employees from shirking arbitrarily close to the 
mandatory retirement age. However, only benefits that are available to only 
those··who leave the firm at the mandatory retirement age serve ~his role. 
These are called supplementary benefits and do not receive the same tax 
advantages as regular benefits covered by ERISA. Only 7"1. of firms in a large 
sample provided supplementary benefits. 1 
In Lazear's model, the firm could replace a mandatory retirement age with 
a "recontracting age 11 at which point wages would be readjusted to the 
employee's marginal product. The optimal mandatory retirement age is set so 
that if employees were given a chance to recontract they would decline to do 
so. However, there is much evidence that many workers accept other jobs at 
lower pay when forced to retire from their career job [see Schulz (1985), and 
Gustman and Steinmeier {1984)]. 
The focus of this paper is the promotions argument. It is suggested that 
the firm may force its older employees to retire in order to open up promotion 
possibilities for younger employees. In a survey of firm managers, it was 
found that 67% of managers felt that •mandatory retirement [was] necessary to 
create job openings and promotion opportunities for younger people."2 This 
reason was cited more frequently than any other reason. 
The production function of the firm is such that the marginal 
productivity of each employee net of training costs depends upon both the 
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employee's experience and his position. Employees are promoted through the 
hierarchy of the firm. Promotion is based upon seniority or experi~nce. Many 
papers in the economics literature discuss why promotion would be based upon 
seniority. These include Carmichael (1983), Ioannides and Pissarides (1983) 
and Rosen {l982}e Most of these papers have a comparative advantage argument 
in them. Actually, it is not necessary for any of the results of this model 
for promotion to be based on seniority. The firm maximizes profits subject to 
choices of a wage schedule, a pension program, a hiring schedule and a 
manda'tory retirement age. It is shown that the firm chooses a ~inite 
mandatory retirement age in many cases. Furthermore, it is shown that 
pensions may play a role in subverting the spirit of ADEA but play no other 
role in firm policy when there are perfect capital markets and no tax 
distortions. Furthermore, it is shown that the relationship between marginal 
product and wage may be very tenuous in management positions. Finally, it is 
shown that firms may discriminate against older potential employees because it 
is difficult to recuperate hiring costs. 
It is assumed that there is a firm with a hierarchy of jobs. Jobs are 
ranked by productivity and then dispersed to employees in order of 
experience. The position each employee gets is a function of what percentage 
of the other employees have less experience. The wage is quoted as a function 
of position and experience. 
The distribution of experience at a firm is a function of the exit rate 
from the firm at all ages, the hiring rate at all ages and the mandatory 
retirement age. If the exit rate rises, the hiring rate falls or the 
mandatory retirement age falls, then employees rise more quickly through the 
hierarchy of the firm. 
Each employee decides when to leave the firm by comparing the present 
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value of staying at the finn to opportunities outside of the finn. It is 
assumed that the distribution of alternative opportunities can be summarized 
in a sufficient statistic which is the reservation value. If the value of 
staying is less than the reservation value, then all employees leave 
immediately. When the average value of staying is greater than the average 
value of leaving, the exit behavior of employees depends upon unspecified 
characteristics of the market. 
It can be shown that under many diverse assumptions about the exit rate 
and wage schedule, the fi nn will maximize the present value of~ prospective 
employee's staying by instituting a mandatory retirement program. This occurs 
even though the prospective employee knows he will be retired at the mandatory 
retirement age. 
However, the goa1 of the firm is not to maximize the net present va1ue of 
staying for its youngest employees. First of all, it is interested in the 
present value of staying for all its employees. Secondly, it is really only 
interested in maximizing its own profits. To the extent that maximi~ing the 
net present value of stayin,g for its employees contributes to maximum profits, 
it follows the interests of its employees. But there will be some competing 
interests between the firm and its employees. 
The finn maximizes profits over choices of wage schedules, pension 
schedules, hiring schedules and mandatory retirement ages. It takes into 
account how its choices affect the exit behavior of its employees which in 
turn affects profits. The exit behavior of employees and the hiring schedule 
determine promotion possibilities, the productivity of its employees and the 
absolute size of the firm. In deciding upon a mandatory retirement age, the 
firm considers the wage and marginal product of its oldest employees. But it 
also considers how its oldest employees' leaving will affect the exit rate of 
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its other employees, and it discounts the marginal product of its oldest 
employees by how effectively younger empl_oyees can replace the oldest 
employees. 
Section II: The Firm's Problem 
The firm has a production function such that it divides up its labor 
force·· into a continuum of positions refe'renced by G e [0,1], i.e., 1006% of 
the labor force has a position worse than G. The productivity of an employee 
with general experience tin position G is p(G,t) where Pi l_ 0 and p2 l, O. 
p(G,t) is determined by the exogenous production function. p(G,t) is net of 
any training costs. 
The firm has a work force with a distribution of experience, H(t). H(t) 
is determined by the exit rate of employees from the firm and the rate at 
which employees are hired for different positions. 
Let X(t) be the exit rate of employees with t years of experience. Then 
the survivor probabi 1ity for emp1oyees who joined the firm with no experience, 
E(t), is: 
(2.1) E(t) = exp{- f6 X(u)du} 
and the survivor probability for employees who joined the firm withs years of 
experience is E(t)/E(s). 
Let Z(t) be the cumulative distribution function for the number of 
employees hired with t years of experience. For example, if all employees are 
hired with no experience, then Z{t) = 1, Vt > O. The densi.ty function for 
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the distribution of employees by experience, H{t), is: 
f~ E(t)Z'(s)ds/E(s)
(2.2) h(t) = _____._ ___ = E(t)D(t) 
f~ f~ E(u)Z'(s}dsdu/E(s) J~ E(u)D{u)du 
Jt 0 
~where O(t) = rrsr- and ~ is the first age at which all employees have 
retired. The numerator is the proportion of employees that started t-s years 
ago who are still working for the firm, summed overs. The denominator is the 
proportion of employees that started u-s years ago who are still working for 
3the firm, summed over u and s. ... 
The firm promotes employees strictly on the basis of seniority. It does 
this because more experienced employees have a comparative advantage in senior 
positions. The firm's promotion policy implies that G = H(t). 
The firm must choose a personnel policy consisting of four components. 
The first component is the wage schedule, w(G,t}. Since G = H(t}, 
w(G,t) =w(H(t),t} =W(t}. The second component is a pension schedule, 
p(t). p(t) is the present value of the stream of benefits an employee would 
receive from the firm if he left after accumulating t years of experience. 
W(t) and p(t) constitute total compensation paid to employees. 
The third component is the hiring schedule, Z(t). If the firm promotes 
only from within, Z(t) = 1 V t1_0 and Z'(t} = 0 Vt> O. If the firm hires 
from without for position G = H{t), then Z'(H-1(G)} > O. 
The last component is a mandatory retirement age,~, at which all 
remaining employees are forced to leave the firm. It is possible that~ is 
large enough so that all employees have voluntarily retired by~. The focus 
of this paper is the determination of~, the mandatory retirement age. 
The qoal of the firm is to maximize long term profits, 
J~ e-rsl(W,p,Z,~)ds where L{W,p,Z,~) is the profit earned by the firm at time 
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s. L(W,p,Z,~) depends upon the wage schedule, W, the pension schedule, p, the 
hiring schedule, Z, and the mandatory retirement age,~. in effect at time 
s. If the firm is in a steady state, then L does not depend upon time; 
maximizing long term profits is equivalent to maximizing instantaneous 
profits, l. 
It is necessary to determine what instantaneous profits are. let: 
(2.3} D(t) = f~ Z'(s)ds/E(s) 
... 
so that E(t)D(t) is the number of employees with t years of experience. 
Instantaneous profits made on employees with t years of experience are: 
(2.4) [p(H(t),t) - W{t) - ~(t)p(t)]E{t)D(t) • 
The firm also hires some new employees with t years of experience and incurs 
hiring costs of S*(t). Thus total instantaneous profits are: 
(2.5) l{w,p,Z,~) = J~[(p(H(t),t) - W(t) - ~(t)p(t))E(t)D(t) 
Section III: Employee Behavior 
The firm needs to maximize L(W,p,Z,~) over choices of W, p, Zand~. 
However, it is constrained by how its decisions affect the exit rate of its 
employees and the cost of hiring new employees. If employees consider the 
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value of leaving the finn to be greater than the value of staying, they will 
leave. Fu~thermore, a new employee will only join the firm if the value of 
accepting a job is greater than the value of rejecting it. 
let V(t) be the average value to a worker with t years of experience of 
being employed at the firm. Let V*(t) be the average value to a worker with t 
years of experience of not being employed at the firm. If workers are 
homogeneous, then the value of staying and leaving for each worker are V(t) 
and V*{t) respectively. If workers are heterogeneous with respect to outside 
opportunities, then the values of staying and leaving vary by worker and V{t) 
and V*{t) are only sufficient statistics for the distribution of values of 
staying and leaving. 
The value of leaving the firm, V*{t), is a function of market wages, the 
cost of search, the value of leisure and the value of any income contingent on 
not working {e.g., Social Security payments and unemployment insurance). It 
is assumed that at some senior age, V*(t} increases rapidly. This represents 
the cost of foregone Social Security payments and the increasing disutility of 
work caused by failing health. 
The value of staying at the firm, V{t), is a function of future wage and 
pension payments, V*(t), the exit rate and the mandatory retirement date: 
(3.1) V(t) = [J; e-r(u-t){W(u) + A(u)(V*(u) + p(u)))E(u)du 
+ e-r(~-t)E(~){V*(~) + p(~))]/E(t) 
which satisfies the differential equation: 
(3.2) v· (t) = rV(t) - W{t) - A(t){V*{t) + p(t) - V(t)) • 
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Equation (3.2) states that V(t) changes over experience by the return-on 
future wages minus the wages paid at t and the value of lost opportunities 
that occurred at t. Whether V(t) and V*(t) are the values of staying and 
leaving or just the average values of staying and leaving, equation (3.2) 
holds. 
Exit rates are determined by each employee deciding when is the optimal 
time for him to 1 eave the firm. If employees are homogeneous with respect to 
the value of staying and leaving, then there is some time; t*, such that the 
exit" rate is >..(t) = O fort < t* and >..(t\!r) = .... If employees a.&'e 
heterogeneous, then >..(t) is a function of V(t) and V*(t): 
(3.3) >..(t) = A(V(t},V*(t)) o 
It is assumed that A1 i O and A2 l, O, that there is some V*(t) such that if 
V(t} < V*(t) then >..(t} ='"',and that >..(t) l O when V(t} <.... 
The cost of hiring employees with t years of experience, S*(t) is also a 
function of V{t) and V*(t): 
(3.4} S*(t} = S(V(t),V*(t)}. 
It is assumed that s1 .5._ O and s2 l. O. In other words, the greater the value 
of joining the firm is relative to not joining, the less it costs the firm to 
find new employees. 
The firm's problem can be written as: 
{3.5) max L(W,p,Z,.) = f~ [(p(H(t),t) - W(t)w,o,z,. 
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- A(t)p(t))E(t)D(t) - S(V(t),V*(t))Z 1 (t)]dt 
subject to 
(3.6) H'(t) = h(t) , 
(3. 7)'' D'(t) = Z'{t)/E(t) , 
(3.8) 
(3.9) -E'(t)/E(t) = A(t) , 
(3.10) A(t) = 6{V{t),V*{t)), and 
{3.11) V'(t) = rV(t) - W(t) - l(t)(V*(t) + p(t) - V(t)) • 
This is a standard calculus of variations problem which can be solved with the 
standard techniques. 
In the next three sections, this problem is solved in increasing 
generality. Section IV contains a simple case in order to builrl intuition. 
Section V adds enough detail to allow for a discussion of the role of pensions 
and turnover costs. Section VI is the most general case and allows for a 
discussion of discrimination in hiring against older workers. 
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· Section IV: Homogeneous Employees 
Assume that all employees face the same V{t) and V*(t) schedule. This 
implies that there is some time, 't, such that: 
0 if t('t 
(4 .. 1) ;\.(t) = 
... if t = 'to 4 
... 
't may be the age when V(t) < V*(t) for the first time or it may be the 
mandatory retirement age. In this example, the firm does not need an explicit 
mandatory retirement age; it can induce a11 employees to retire at any 
particular age by just reducing total compensation enough so that it is in 
each employee's interest to leave. 
Furthermore, assume that: 
S* t = 0 and V(O) > V*{O} 
(4.2) S*{t) = 
.., otherwise 
It is obvious that the firm should only promote from within, i.e., Z(t) = 1 
Vt> O. Furthermore, the firm should set total compensation for each cohort 
so that V(t} = V*(t} until some time, 't, that it wants employees to leave. 
Let W*(t} be the total minimum compensation necessary to keep V{t) l_ V*(t). 
Since V(t) = V*(t) until 't, all employees remain with the firm 
until 't and then leave. Thus the survivor function is: 
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1 t < 't' 
{4.3) E{t) = 
0 t > 't'. 
This implies that the distribution of employees by experience is 
H(t) = t/~ forte [O,'t']. 
The firm has already picked the optimal hiring schedule and total 
compensation schedule. It only needs to pick an optimal mandatory retirement 
age: '' ... 
(4.4) max L('t') = J~ (P(t, t) - W*(t))dt - S*
~ 
The optimal mandatory retirement age is at the ·age when: 
(4.5) 
which is equivalent to: 
Equation (4.6) says that the firm should set the mandatory retirement age at 
the age when the total compensation necessary to keep the oldest employee is 
equal to the average product of all of its employees plus the gains to a more 
experienced workforce. The necessary second order condition is that W*{t) is 
rising faster than the right hand side of equation (4.6) at~. 
The first and second order conditions for a finite mandatory retirement 
age should be met if W*(t) rises fast enough. Furthermore, the optimal 
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mandatory retirement age is likely to be at age- 65 if V*{t) rises 
discontinuously at that age because of the earninqs test for collecting Social 
Security benefits. 
If p2 = 0, i.e., there are no productivity gains to experience, then the 
mandatory retirement age is the age when total compensation is equal to 
average product. This occurs even though the oldest employee's product is 
p{l) which is greater than the average product. Since all employees would be 
as effective as the oldest in the top position, the loss of the top employee 
is only the average product. When p2 >·o, there is an added c05t to firing 
the oldest employee. However, there is still no reason why W*{'t') is equal to 
the product of the oldest employee. 
Up until now it has been assumed that the firm hires one unit of 
employeeso Another possible reasonable assumption would be that it maintains 
a total workforce of one unit. Let employees be hi red at the rate a. The 
total workforce is then: 
(4.7) ~ I~ E(t)dt 
which in this example is equal to «'t'. In order to maintain a workforce of 
size 1, the firm must hire new employees at the rate, The firm's 
maximization problem becomes: 
{4.8) max L('t') = l [J0't p(l, t) - W*(t))dt - S*]'t 't'
't' 
which has an optimum when: 
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The difference between the highest wage and the average wage must equal the 
gains to increased experience plus the reduction in hiring costs. The rest of 
the intuition from the problem holding the number of employees hired fixed is 
the same. 
Section V: Heterogeneous Employees 
· Assume that employees are heterogeneous with respect to outside 
opportunities. Thus: 
(5.1) X(t) = b(V(t),V*(t)). 
b(V(t),V*(t}) is conmon knowledge but-any particular employee's value of 
leaving is unknown to the firm. Further, assume that: 
S(V(O), V*(O)) t = 0 
(5.2) S*(t) = 
a, t > o. 
Thus Z(t) = 1 Vt 1.. O. 
The firm maximizes instantaneous profits by solving a calculus of 
variations problem which is developed below. let x,(t) be the set of dependent 
variables: 
(5.3) x,(t) = [H(t), W(t), E(t), X(t), V(t), h(t), p(t)]. 
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Let: 
(5.4) O(t, x(t), x'(t)) = [p(H(t),t) - W(t) - A(t)p{t)]E(t) ~ 
Then the firm maximizes: 
{5.5) . L(W,p,~) = /~ C(t, x(t), x'(t))dt 
subject to: 
(5.6) H'(t) = h{t) , 
(5.7) h'(t)/h(t) = E'(t)/E(t), 
(5.8) -E'{t)/E(t) = A(t) , 
(5.9) A(t) = t(V(t),V*(t)), and 
(5.10) V'(t) = rV(t) - W(t) - A(t){V*(t) + p(t) - V(t)) 
and the terminal conditions: 
This problem can be written in Lagrangian form as: 
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(s.12) Ht, x;(t), x;'(t)) = o(t, x;(t), x'(t)) 
+ o1(t)[H'(t) - h(t)J 
+ o3(t)[h'(t) + X{t)h(t}J 
+ o5(t)[X(t) - ~(V(t},V*(t)}] ... 
+ o6(t)[V'(t} - rV(t) + W(t) + X{t){V*(t) + p{t) -_ V(t))] • 
First order conditions for an interior solution5 are 'o~/'ox_ = (d/dt){'o~/'ox;'): 6 
(H) , 
{5.14) E = 06 (W) , 
(E) , 
(V) , 
(h) , and 
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(5.19) (p) • 
Note that the first order conditions for Wand p, equations (5.14) and 
(5.19), are equivalent whenever A> 0, i.e., whenever any employee collects a 
pensions Since there are perfect capital markets, the firm and its employees 
are indifferent between the same sets of wage and pension schedules. Given 
any optimal wage and pension schedule, there is ·a continuum of wage and 
pension schedules that are as good. One of them sets p(t) = O. Thus, without 
loss of generality, p(t) is set equal to" zero. ... 
The remaining equations can be reduced to four equations in H, >.., 
V and W: 
(5.20) H' '/HI = ->.. , 
(5.21) >.. = ll.(V,V*), 
(5.22} V' = rV - W- >..(V* - V) , and 




and c(t) = /~p2{Hjs)ds is the cumulative value of experience. Initial and 
terminal conditions that determine the optimal ~ are: 
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V(O) + /~ [p(H,u) - W]Edu = V*'(O) -
61
v(o)~V*{O)) ... 
{5.30) 1 = -S1{V(O),V*{O)) 
· Equations {5.27) and (5.28) imply that the firm should set a wage 
schedule so that all employees retire voluntarily by the mandatory retirement 
age. Technically, no employees should be forced to retire. However, this 
only means that the finn should offer older employees such a low wage that 
effectively they are forced to retire. This is analogous to the well known 
discussion of the distinction between quits and layoffs. 
Equation (5.29) states that the total value of the finn-employee 
relationship, the value of the job to the employee plus the profits made on 
employees, must equal the value of alternative opportunities with an 
adjustment for turnover. This equation determines the optimal mandatory 
retirement age as long as the wage necessary to keep any employees rises with 
age after some age, t. 
Equation (5.30) states that at the optimum, a small increase in the value 
of a job at time zero should be just offset by the reduced cost of search. 
The ADEA prevents the firm from imposing a mandatory retirement age 
21 
before 70 and from lowering its older employees' wages solely because of 
age. However, ADEA says nothing about pensions. In fact the early retirement 
benefits provided by most pension plans have the same effect as reduced wages; 
both can cause employees to retire before the earliest allowed mandatory 
retirement age. Thus, a restriction on reducing wages is irrelevant unless 
there is also a restriction on total compensation. 
Section VI: Promotion from Outside 
... 
The firm's problem written in equations (3.5) through (3.11) now is 
considered in its complete generality. However, pension benefits are set 
equal to zero since only total compensation matters. 7 The problem is 
rewritten for the reader's convenience: 




(6.2} H' (t) = h(t) , 
(6.3) O' (t) = Z' (t)/E{t) , 
(6.4) :!Lit) = ~J + E'j_tJnm- U1tJ rm-, 
(6 .. 5) -E'{t)/E(t) = A(t) , 
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(6.6) A(t) = ~(V(t),V*(t)) , and 
(6.7) V'(t) = rV{t) - W{t) - A(t)(V*{t) - V{t)) 
with terminal and initial conditions: 
(6.8) 
let: ,. ... 
(6.9} ~(t} = [H{t), W{t), E(t), k(t}, V(t), Z(t}, D(t}, h(t)J 
and: 
(6.10) 0{t, x(t), x'(t)) = [p(H(t},t) - W(t)]E(t)D(t} 
- S{V(t),V*(t))Z'(t). 
Then the Lagrangian equation is: 
(6.11} ,(t), ,t(t), ,):'(t)) = O{t, t(t), !'(t)} 
+ o2(t}[E'(t) + A(t)E(t)] 
+ o3(t)[h'(t) - ~(i)) h(t) + A(t}h(t)] 
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+ o6(t)[V'{t) - rV(t) + W(t) 
+ A(t)(V*(t) - V(t))]. 
... 
In theory, necessary first order conditions can be taken and solved. In order 
to determine the optimal mandatory retirement age, initial and terminal 
conditions 111Jst be taken. · But terminal conditions are only valid if the 
interior solution to equation (6.11) is a true optimum. In fact, the optimal 
solution 111Jst have a corner. There is some age, t* < -&, at which all 
employees have been hired; Z{t*) = 1 and Z1 (t) = 0 Vt>- t*. It can be shown 
that t* is at the point where: 
S(V{t*),V*{t*)) = J;* ~ [p(H(s),s) - W(s)]ds 
'f !r1tl_ Is .- Jt* ~ 0 p2(H{x),x)dxds s 
At t*, hiring costs must be equal to the average product of employees with at 
least t* years of experience adjusted for gains to experience. After t*, 
h;ring costs are greater than can be earned by employees hired at that age. 
The firm is only willing to hire new employees older than t* if it can 
pay them a lower wage than an employee with the same experience already 
hired. This idea is similar to models of discrimination against women because 
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of higher turnover costs. See Ba.rnes and Jones (1974) or Salop and Salop 
(1976). 
Since S{V(t),V*{t)) > 0 for all t and the right hand side of equation 
(6.31) approaches zero as t* approaches~, there must beat*<~ 
at which equation (6.31) is satisfied. At this age, the finn solves a problem 
similar to that solved in Section V. Thus, the optimal mandatory retirement 
age already has been characterized for this section. 
... 
Section VII: Conclusions 
A model of the firm has been presented in which the productivity of its 
employees depends on their positions as well as their experience. Each 
employee leaves the firm when it is optimal for him to do so. It has been 
shown that: 
1) The optima1 mandatory retirement age is a function .of the reservation 
value function, the productivity schedule and the increase to average 
productivity of having an older workforce. 
2) When capital markets are perfect, for any optimal wage and pension 
schedule, there is another wage schedule with no pension benefits 
that is as good for both the finn and its employees. This occurs 
because employees can save as effectively as the firm. 
3) Pensions may play a role in inducing employees to retire when there 
is a) a ban on mandatory retirement and also b) restrictions on 
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lowering older employees' wages. The firm can reduce the total value 
of employment effectively either by reducing wages or by reducing the 
present value of pensions. The firm reduces the present value of 
pensions to its oldest employees by providing large early retirement 
benefits. The reduction of the present value of pensions for older 
employees has the same effect on employee retirement behavior as wage 
reductions would have had they not been illegal • 
The wage schedule depends more 
., 
on an employee's opportunities outside 
of the finn than on his marginal product. It is only in equilibrium 
that wage may equal° marginal product. 
5) Our Social Security system causes firms to make the mandatory 
retirement age 65 and causes many employees to retire before age 
65. The benefits test and early benefits make this happen. 
6) Firms discriminate against potential older employees because it is 
difficult to reqain hirinq costso This is even true when the added 
benefit of having an older workforce is considered. 
Unfortunately, there are some basic questions that this model does not 
address. These include: 
1) Why do some firms have a mandatory retirement age while others do 
not? 
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2) Why is the incidence of mandatory retirement correlated with firm 
size? 
3) Why is the incidence of mandatory retirement correlated with the 
incidence of pension programs? 
The answers to these questions depend upon the form of the exit rate function, 
the productivity function and the search cost function. 
· ihe most intriguing question concerning mandatory retirement is why the 
great majority of firms with a mandatory retirement program have a mandatory 
retirement age of 65. Both Lazear (1979) and this paper suggest that the 
Social Security earnings test causes this. But, it is not clear that such a 
result would follow if employees were heterogeneous. For example, in a model 
with heterogeneous ability we might observe the existence of a tenure age as 
exists in universities and many law firms or even multi-tiered tenure 
structures as exists in the armed forces. This is a topic for future 
research. 
It is too early to derive any policy implications from this model. It is 
clear that older workers are discriminated against both because they are fired 
at a somewhat arbitrary age independent of their ability to work and because 
they have a difficult time finding new jobs. This model presents some reasons 
that firms discriminate against older workers. It implies that it may be 
Pareto optimal to allow for such discrjmination. However, there are many 
firms that have no mandatory retirement age. Before evaluating the value of 
mandatory retirement programs we also must understand why some firms do not 
have mandatory retirement programs. 
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Footnotes 
1. See Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) for this data. 
2. Wi 11 i am Mercer-Mendi nger, Inc., 11 Empl oyer Attitudes Toward Mandatory 
Retirement,N New York, 1977, page 6. 
3. For example, let Z(t) = 1, t _?_ 0 and: 




Then E(t) = 1 if t <-,; and E(t) = 0 if t l i:. h{t) is equal to: 
{2.2b) h(t) = 1/f~ E(u)du - -1 't 
and H(t) = t/i;, which is the uniform distribution with bounds [O, i;]. 
4. The flavor of the results would not change if A(t) = {: l O 
t=-,; 
5o The optimal solution to the firm's problem must be an interior solution 
between O and-,;. The only variables that could possibly have corner solutions 
are A, E, W, p and V. If A(t) =•then t = i:. A(t) > 0 when V(t) <•by 
assumption. V(t) can never fall below V*{t) and V(t) only diverge to•can 
if future total compensation diverges to infinity. But the firm would lose 
money by providing such high total compensation. 
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6. The independent variable, t, is implic~t. 
7. Another reason to drop pensions is that it does not make sense to pay two 
employees who leave at the same time the same pension benefit if they started 
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